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MARBURY vs. MADISON
Application to the Supreme Court, to compel Madison
to deliver to Marbury his commission as Justice of the
Peace for the District of Columbia.
"Inall cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party,
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction," says
the 2nd section of Art. III of the Constitution.
Marshall, C. J., has satisfied himself that those words
make it impossible to bestow on that court original jurisdiction in any other cases. The Constitution makers could
not make sure that the court should have the named jurisdiction without by implication, making impossible the gift
of other jurisdictions by Congress. The Act of Congress
which undertook to give original jurisdiction in cases of
Mandamus, is a violation of the Constitution.
The Chief Justice advances to the position that every
statute which violates the constitution is void. The theory
of every government with a written constitution "must be
that an Act of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution
is void"; must be: that is, if the mind of such "government" acts as does the mind of C. J. Marshall. But there
are other types of mind. In his American Commonwealth.
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James Brice said "there are countries on the European
continent where, although there exists a constitution superior to the legislature, the courts are not allowed to hold
a legislative Act invalid because the legislature is deemed to have the right of taking its own view of the Constitution. This seems to be the case both in France and in
Switzerland."
In his recently published Modem Democracies, Vol.
X, page 385, he says the new constitution of Germany appears to leave to the Supreme Court the decision of legal
questions arising between the Reich (the Federation) and
the states within it, but not the decision of the question
whether a law infringes the constitution. The constitution
of Czecho-Slovakia provides that "Judges in passing upon
a legal question may examine the validity of an Ordinance;
as to a law they may inquire only whether it was duly promulgated." With more imagination and less dogmatism,
the Chief Justice would have refrained from saying that
"the theory of every such government must be: that an
act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.'"
The justice thinks it emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. But, why emphatically? The President, the chief officers of state the
innumerable executive officers throughout the nation are
required incessantly to execute the law. How can they do
this, until they find out what the law is? It is folly to
suppose that of all the functionaries of the state, only the
judges are obliged to know and by act, declare, what the
law is.
From the duty to apply the law, is inferred the duty,
when there is inconsistency between law and constitution,
to decide for the latter and against the former. But, to
what disastrous confusion would such a principle lead, if it
were acted on by all the marshalls, and port-masters and
collectors of revenue, and the numberless other federal
officials.
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There is no solid reason for separating judges from
other officers, and for attributing to the former the duty
and the right of treating as v oid an act of Congress, if
found to contravene the constitution, and refusing them to
the latter. What sort of government would that be, in
which every executive officer could and should become a
critic of the validity of the acts of Congress he is called on
to execute?
Chief Justice Marshall thinks that those who controvert
the principle that the constitution "is to be considered in
courts, as a paramount law" are compelled to say that
courts must close their eyes on the constitution and see only
the law. But why has he afflicted himself with this enforced
blindness of the courts, and forgotten the enforced blindness of all the executive officers, who have serious duties
cast on them by statutes, many of which, if pronounced null
by the courts, would leave them without legal justification
for their acts in execution of them?
The courts swear to obey the constitution. But so do
the legislators; so does the President. Is the President to be
excused for refusing to carry out a statute, if he believes it
unconstitutional? Or has he a right to adhere to his own
conception of the constitution, until, and only until the
courts have expressed a different opinion? The judges
swear to support the Constitution. Then they must have
the right to nullify a statute which they think
unconstitutional. "How immoral to impose it on them, if
they were to be used as the instruments and the knowing instruments for violating what they swear to support." And is
it not just as immoral to require the President, or any officez
who takes such an oath to execute a statute which he thinks
unconstitutional?
It was supposed, we may surmise, by those who made
the constitution, that there would be deference enough for
the constitution, in those who would become executive,
legislative and judicial officers, to incline them to seek its
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meaning and to carry it out in the sense thus discovered.
Nobody thought that the men six, nine, who might be selected, from time to time, to act as judges, would know
better what the constitution meant, than the Presidents,
cabinet officers, senators and representatives from time to
time. Nobody would suspect that these men would be
more obedient to the constitution, than the congress and
the executive officers who influence the actions of the
President.
There is always a chance that a provision of the constitution will be overlooked, or its signification misunderstood. Fallibility is the universal human attribute. But
does it afflict only the non-judicial officers, leaving the
judges immune? When they declare an act void, they may
be grieviously mistaken. Composed of practical men, the
country may with composure trust to the patriotism and intelligence of its Congress, and agree to take the risks of an
occasional misinterpretation by it; since scarcely less is the
risk of misinterpretation by the judges, and the possibility
that statutes (e. g. the Missouri Compromise after being on
the statute books 36 years,) may, years after their enactment be denounced as void by the courts, is an immense
inconvenience.
The words of Chief Justice Black, of Pennsylvania,
(Sharpless vs. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 147; Hall, CaseBook p. 12) are worth reflecting on. "'There is nothing
more easy than to imagine a thousand tyrannical things
which the legislature may do, if the members forgot all their
duties; disregard utterly the obligations they owe to their
constituents, and recklessly determine to trample upon right
and justice. But to take away the power from the legislature because they may abuse it, and to give the judges the
right of controlling it, would not be advancing a single step
since the judges can be imagined to be as corrupt and as
wicked as legislators. What is worse still, the judges are
almost entirely irresponsible, and heretofore they have been
altogether so, while the members of the legislature, who
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could do the imaginary things, referred to, would be
scourged into retirement by their indignant masters."
In order to keep the people of the nation in good humor
with this colossal power, assumed by the courts, the interested classes have striven to create a spirit of veneration
for the judges, similar to that with which royalty used to be
regarded, in the days when it was not so generally perceived that the putting of a man into a great office, did not
imply the clothing of him with qualities different from those
he had previously had. As it is dangerous to give a king,
or a small oligarchy supreme power, because of the risk of
its being abused, so it is dangerous to vest a small court
with the prerogative of annulling the will of the living organ of the living 100,000,000 of people, on the pretext
that it clashes with the will of people who have already been
dead a century and a half, which will the five, seven, nine
men called judges claim to have better means of discovering than members of co-ordinate branches of the
government.
The courts do not promulgate laws but they nullify
laws which the law making authority has declared. The
despotic power of the king acted affirmatively. That of
the courts acts negatively by arresting the legislation which
the country may enact. Instead of the veto of the king,
a living personage, we have subjected ourselves to the veto
of the dead, the dead of 1787, the judges claiming exclusively to speak for them as their only authentic
interpreters.
KOEHLER vs. HILL
(Hall's Cases on Constitutional Law)
A has sold beer to B, and sues B for the price. B's
defence is that the sale was illegal. If so, the price could
not be recovered. What, if anything, made the sale illegal, was a constitutional amendment. The Constitution
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of the state, Iowa, required amendments to be agreed to by
two successive sessions of the General Assembly. The alleged amendment read thus "No person shall manufacture
for sale, or sell, or keep for sale, as a beverage any intoxicating liquor whatever including ale, wine and beer."
In this form the 18th Assembly including the Senate passed
it, according to the enrolled resolution signed by the president of that body. According to the journals of the senate, the amendment contained, after the word beverage, the
words "or to be used."
The 19th Assembly passed the resolution without the
words "or to be used."
The court assumed that the resolution must pass both
the houses of the assembly, and both the successive assemblies in precisely the same form.
The court further assumed that the journal, and not the
engrossed resolution, signed by the president, was the evidence of what the resolution was as adopted by the senate
of the 18th assembly. The evidence of the clerk of the
senate is pitted against that of the president of that body.
The court decided that the former was better than the latter. Was the fidelity of the clerk, his alertness in noticing
what was done by the senate, his memory of what was done,
greater than that of the president?
Or was the result attainable by preferring the clerk to the president, more acceptable to the court?
Some courts are unwilling to be controlled by the
journal for the purpose of annulling a statute. Ex-President
W. H. Taft and the present Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, in an article in the Public Ledger of August 31 st,
1920, said: "'The certificate of the officers appointed by
law to make such certificates, especially the governor and
the presiding officers of the two houses, is likely to be given
exclusive weight by the Supreme Court of the United States.
It has refused to permit the journals of Congress which
showed clearly that the McKinley Tariff bill did not pass
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both houses in the same form, to contradict and invalidate

the certificate of the presiding officers of both houses and the
signature of the President. It has made the same ruling as
to a territorial statute.

It gave similar effect to such a cer-

tificate when it was contended that there was no quorum
present to pass a bill, because the roll-call did not disclose
by the answers of the members, that a quorum was present
and the clerk counted it."

The 19th General Assembly, which submitted the proposal to amend the constitution, to the people, declared it

to have been agreed to by the 18th Assembly.

The court

refused to accept this as evidence of such agreement, pre-

ferring the journal of the senate of the 18th General
Assembly.
But, let us concede that the clerks' version of what was
enacted in the senate of the 18th assembly is to be preferred
to that of the senate's president. Then the fact is that the
houses of representatives of the 18th and 19th Assembly,
and the senate of the 19th Assembly, adopted the same
phraseology, but the resolution of the senate of the 18th
assembly had four words in it which were not in the other.
Both senate resolutions agreed in prohibiting manufacturing for sale, selling, keeping for sale as a beverage any intoxicating liquor. One of these resolutions forbids in addition the manufacturing for sale, selling, keeping for sale
liquors as a beverage, "or to be used." If this means anything not previously stated it adds another kind of act to
the acts otherwise prohibited. There is no incongruity between forbidding acts a, b, and c, and forbidding acts a,
b, c, and d. It is quite possible to complete the prohibition
of a, b, and c by the concurring in that prohibition of both
houses of both legislations, the 18th and the 19th, although
the prohibition of d is not complete, because of the failure
of the houses and of the senate of the 19th legislature, to
unite upon it. Both senates, both houses, a majority of 30,000 voters have agreed in forbidding a. b. c. Only one
senate also forbade d. And, thinks the court, because the
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last class of acts suggested by the 18th senate, was not effectually forbidden none of them were. The process of
thought is admirable.
But, a larger question remains. The resolution of the
two legislatures, the 18th and the 19th, was submitted to
the voters. A majority of 30,000 ratified it. It might have
been a majority of 100,000 or 200,000. The ratification
might have been by a unanimous vote. Nevertheless the
four or five men who compose the majority of the court assign to themselves the power to say, to the people, you can
do nothing, but in conformity to a plan created by those
who preceded you in this sublunary scene. They have told
you how you may do things, and it is our business to make
you obey them, or to frustrate your acts by nullification.
The Constitution of Iowa, like that of Pennsylvania, declares that "all political power is inherent in the people."
They have a right, at all times, to alter or reform the same
(i. e. government) whenever the public good may require
it. But, "the people" are not the living people. They have
at any time only the power which those who preceded
them have allowed to them. Although those predecessors
of 40, 60, 80, 100 years ago, have vanished from the world,
the four or five judges are custodians of their will, and will
give effect to it, as against the disobedient acts of their contemporaries. The dead war against the innovations of the
living masses, and reduce them to submission by the vetoes
and prohibitions of the judges, who claim to speak the final
word as to the intentions of the deceased, and to be the
only bearers of unchangeable loyalty towards them.
To the contention of counsel that whether a constitution has been properly adopted is a political question, and
must be decided by the so-called political department of the
government, i. e. the executive and legislative departments,
the court asserts that so to hold would be to say that it may
be disregarded with impunity.
Yet, that non-judicial departments may decide questions for the judges is admitted in the case of Luther vs.
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Borden, so extensively discussed. The President decided to
defend the charter government of Rhode Island. The
courts of the United States, therefore, will deem that the
proper government, and not a rival government set up on a
revolutionary way.
If a constitution is acted under by the people, and is
recognized by the legislature and the governor, and a court
is operating in pursuance of it, that court will have no independent opinion as to the validity of the adoption of the
constitution. It will be governed by the recognition of the
people and of the other branches of the government.
That a "political" question may be decided, even for
the courts, by the action of the non-judicial branches of the
government, is tacitly assumed. But, no attempt is made to
define "'political." If by "political" is meant, decidable even
for the courts, by non-judicial authority, it is a truism to say
that the courts do not decide political questions. But, in
every case the question will be, is the question one to be decided by President or Congress, by governor or legislature,
and not by the courts, except in conformity with them. To
say that the courts do not decide "political" questions is to
say that they do not decic~e questions which they do not
decide.
Whether the steps provided by the Constitution for its
amendment, have been performed, other than judges may
know, indeed must know. Shall the president of the senate
decide what the senate has done? Or the speaker of the
House? Or the Secretary of State. Finality must be somewhere. Why are these officers not as able to. pronounce
the fact, as judges, who have no direct knowledge of the
subject? Why must we adopt the principle that all officers
are fallible, or disloyal to constitution, other than the judicial, and that the mere turning of a lawyer into a judge, by
the practiced methods, confers on him a more than papal
infallibility; a wisdom, a knowledge, a discretion, a patriotism, which no other process known to man here below,
has yet been found to confer.

62
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The opinion contains the superficial principle of the
right of revolution. If the revolution is successful, well for
the revolutionists. If it is not successful, "they are liable to
punishment as traitors." Strange "right" is that the exercise of which may be thus chastised. When will lawyers
and judges cease talking of the right to do that which the
state nevertheless punishes? Legal right, there can not be.
Whether there is a so-called moral right, depends, for each
thinker, upon his emotions, his prejudices, his body of political principles, and it is idle to speak of it.
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MOOT COURT
BURNETT vs. QUIGG
Building Restrictions-Injunctions

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Burnett owned ten contingent lots, Nos. 1, 2, 3, etc. He
built a house on No. 1, he sold No. 2 to Quigg, the deed stating
that no building should be erected on it at any time, except on a
plan submitted to Burnett, his heirs and assigns, and to be approved by him or them. In violation of the agreement Quigg was
about to build on No. 2, Lots No. 9 and No. 10, had been sold under similar restrictions and the vendees had violated the agreement, but Burnett did not interfere. He files a bill to enjoin
Quigg from violating the agreement.
Naame for Petitioner.
Obermiller for Respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
POLISHER, J.-Burnett filed this bill in equity seeking to
enjoin Quigg from violating certain restrictive covenants contained in the deed of Burnett to Quigg.
Equity has jurisdiction to entertain this bill and grant relief, the remedy at law-a recovery of damageo--being inadequate and incomplete. Muzzarelli vs. Hulshizer-163 Pa. 643.
Hohl vs. Modell-264 Pa. 516.
The right of an owner of a plot to divide it up into lots and
impose building restrictions upon them has always been recognized; and the validity of the covenants universally conceded.
Equity will enjoin, by injunction, the violation of such covenants
by the grantee. Church's Appeal-67 Pa. 512. Landell et al vs
Hamilton et al-175 Pa. 327. Dewar vs. Carson-259 Pa. 599.
Hohl vs. Modell-supra.
While building restrictions are enforcible in equity, they are
not favored by the courts, and covenants relating to -them, are
strictly construed. Crofton vs. The Church-208 Pa. 209. Dewar vs. Carsen-supra.
However, acquiescence on the part of one who is entitled to
enforce such covenants, in the violation of these restrictions, has
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often been held to bar relief against subsequent violations.
Whether the acquiescence to relief depends upon the facts and
circumstances in each case-i. e. the character and purpose of the
restrictions, the nature of the violations, the effect of the violations upon the general scheme, the distance between the lots upon
which the violations occurred, and the effect of the violations upon
the value of neighboring lots. Appeal of the Fidelity Insurance
Etc. Co-115 Pa. 157. Orne vs. Friedenburg-143 Pa. 487.
Hohl vs. Modell-264 Pa. 516.
The reason for this is that since restrictive covenants in
deeds are for the purpose of preserving designed conditions, it
follows that when one who is entitled to enforce them has failed
to do so, he is deemed to have acquiesced in the violation and
abandoned the scheme originally intended. Scharer vs. Panther105 S. W. 668. Brown vs. Wrightman-90 Pac. 467. Ocean
City Land Co. vs. Weber (N. J.)-91 Atl. 600. Lignot vs.
Jackle (N. J.)-65 At. 221. Brigham vs. Mulok Co.-70 Atl.
185.
In the Ocean City Asso. vs. Charlfant-65 N. J. E. 156,
where the facts were that a corporation had sold lots in a certain section subject to certain restrictions and one of the grantees
had violated the covenant in which the Company had acquiesced,
it was held that the acquiescence of the grantor in that violation
was a bar to relief to subsequent violations.
And as was said by Judge Paxson in Orne vs. Friedenburg,
supra.: "In considering applications for relief by injunction
against breaches of restrictive covenants, contained in conveyances of real property, the courts require due diligence upon the
part of the plaintiff seeking the relief, and laches or acquiescence
upon his part in violation of the restrictive covenant will ordinarily defeat his application. . . Where a vendor of real property takes from each of several purchasers a covenant that he will
leave unbuilt a certain portion of the premises conveyed, he will
not be permitted to enjoin a breach of this covenant by one of the
purchasers, when he has permitted prior purchasers to violate it
without proceeding against them."
In the case at bar, the plaintiff allowed two violations by
other grantees without any objection on his part. What was the
character of the violations, their effect upon the general building
scheme, is left for us, by the vagueness of the facts, to speculate
upon. A fair presumption would be that they were slight deviations and caused no serious change of the general scheme; or
vice versa. The lots upon which the violations occurred were
numbers nine and ten. There were two violations. If there had
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been only one violation and acquiescence therein, the plaintiff
might have been excused in his conduct as mere oversight, but
when two violations are acquiesced in, the intention of the plaintiff to abandon the scheme seemed to be confirmed. And once
having abandoned the scheme, he could not legally revive his intention to enforce it. Once abandoned, the schenxe can no longer
exist. And if equity were to be applied in practice, as it is in
theory, professed to be, the plaintiff should be barred in his bill
for relief. Why should he be given the benefit of a covenant
which by his conduct he has seen fit to disregard in partial destruction of his building scheme?
But, in Pennsylvania, the plaintiff is not given his just desserts. The courts entertain his petition, grant the relief sought,
and use all their machinery to enforce their inequitable decree.
The basis of equity jurisdiction-its justice, fairness and its
most illustrious maxims-cease to function in the particular
case, and the plaintiff is given relief.
We must accept the precedent set down by our Supreme
Court in Harmon vs. Burow-263 Pa. 188, which is exactly in
point with the case in bar, where it was held that the plaintiff
could get the relief he sought.
JUDGMENT RENDERED ACCORDINGLY, and the defendant is hereby enjoined from continuing -his intended violation of
the building scheme.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
But little needs to be added to the excellent opinion of the
lower court.
The restriction in this case, is a valid one. Harmon vs.
Burow-263 Pa. 188. Enforcement of such a restriction may be
by injunction. Ibid.
The plaintiff failed to enforce it, as respecting 9 and 10. It
would not follow that he was not sufficiently interested in the enforcement of it, as respects the lot immediately adjacent to his
own. Quigg, the grantee, finding the restriction in his deed,
should have believed that it had a serious purpose, if the violations as to 9 and 10 -hadalready occurred. If they occurred after
Quigg's purchase, he, as well as Burnett, the plaintiff, -had the
power to enforce it, if its enforcement was of any value to him.
If it was not, no harm has come to him from its nonenforcement.
We agree with the result reached by the learned court below.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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BANK vs. ANDERSON
Negotiable

Instruments-Banks-Duty to Preserve Notes

Held

As Collateral Security
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Anderson made a note for $2000, payable to the plaintiff
bank. He had a note for $2000, payable to himself, made by X
and endorsed by Y. This note he delivered to the bank as collateral security. When this note matured, the bank failed to take
the steps necessary to perfect the obligation of Y as endorser, so
that Y became discharged. In this suit upon Anderson's note,
he alleges that the Bank negligently lost the liability of Y, and as
the other party to the note, X, was financially worthless, he has
the right to set-off the amount thus lost, against the note on which
this suit is brought.
Righter for the Plaintiff.
Schnee for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCHEUFELE, J.-It
seems to be a well established principle
in this State, that the duty of protecting collateral security, deposited with it to secure an obligation, rests upon the bank holding such security and it seems clear that it must take all necessary legal steps to preserve it. If it is lost -r rendered worthless
by its negligence, it is responsible to its debtor.
"The holder of collateral security is bound to preserve it or
collect it and apply it, for the benefit of the assignor. His duties
in respect to it are active, and he must employ reasonable diligence in collecting the collateral note and applying it to the principal debt" Muirhead vs. Kirkpatrick-21 Pa. 237.
"The pledgee of collateral security, alone, is empowered to receive the money to be paid upon it, and to control it, in order to
protect his right under the assignment. This is the ground of the
creditor's liability for the collateral and it is well settled in this
State, that where collateral is lost through the negligence of the
creditor, he must account for the loss to his debtor, who invested
him with its entire control." Hanna vs. Holton-78 Pa. 334.
"When a note is deposited with a bank as collateral security,
for the payment of an indebtedness due the bank, with its debtor's
endorsement upon it, the bank takes it as pledgee, and not merely for transmission for collection. The creditor or pledgee obtains possession and control of the paper, and if it matures while
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the debtor's obligation remains unpaid, the creditor may enforce collection and apply the proceeds to the payment of the
debt. The pledgor has neither the possession nor control of the
collateral, and is not in a position to present it for payment or
acceptance, and if dishonored, to have it protested. Therefore
the duty of protecting the collateral rests upon the bank." Farmer's Bank vs. Nelson-255 Pa. 455.
The doctrine enunciated by the above cases is not merely an
arbitrary rule of law, but is founded upon sound logic and common sense. It imposes no unnecessary hardship upon the holder of
the collateral, merely a duty which in justice and fair dealing
he ought to perform. Nor is this doctrine peculiar to this
State.
The case at bar must be distinguished from those cases in
which commercial paper is left by its customer for collection. In
the latter case, the bank is the agent of the owner for transmission only, and is not liable for the negligence or default of its
correspondents or agents, to whom it is necessary to transmit the
paper, if it used reasonable care and diligence in the selection of
its agents. When, however, as in the present case, the note is
deposited with the bank as collateral security, for a loan made by
it to the owners of the collateral, a different duty is imposed upon
it.
In the case at bar, the failure of the plaintiff bank to take
the necessary steps upon the collateral note, entitles the defendant, to set off the amount of such note. Since the amount of the
note upon which this suit is brought is identical with the amount
of the collateral note, there can be no recovery.
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The well conceived and expressed opinion of the learned
court below, makes elaborate discussion of the case quite unnecessary.
When the obligation of another is given by a debtor to his
creditor as security for the debt, the latter undertakes to do
what is necessary to maintain the obligation, and to secure
its fruition. A note, with an endorser, was given by the debtor
to the creditor. It was the duty of the latter to preserve the
liability of the endorser, by making the required demand for
payment of the maker and by giving notice of non-payment to
the endorser. He has failed to do so, and the endorser -has been
discharged. He was solvent, and the maker insolvent. It follows
then, that the creditor must account for the value of the note,
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whose value has been thus lost. When sued on his primary debt,
he may set off the amount of this loss, against the debt. This the
learned court below has allowed him to do. Its judgment is
therefore,
AFFIRMED.
WHIPPLE vs. CANFIELD
Ejectment-Fraudulent Conveyances-Enforceability of Contract

to Reconvey
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ejectment.-Whipple conveyed the premises to Canfield, for
the price of $1000.00. They were worth $5000.00. The motive
for making the conveyance was the desire to prevent creditors
from taking the land in execution. Of this purpose, Canfield was
aware. He agreed to reconvey on Whipple's paying him $1500.00.
Whipple has tendered $1500.00 and demanded a reconveyance
which Canfield has refused to make.
Garber for Plaintiff.
Gearhart for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GLASS, J.-The question to be decided in this case Is,can a grantor who in defraud of creditors, fraudulently conveys
property to a grantee upon the latter's agreement to reconvey, enlist the services of a court to regain the property, when the
grantee refuses to reconvey as agreed?
(1)
It is well settled, that a conveyance in fraud of creditors
is illegaL
(2)
Also, that a contract made for an illegal purpose is
void.
(3)
A court will not aid either party to a contract, to recover property parted with on faith of contract where the contract is void because of illegality.
The action of ejectment in the present case is in the nature
of an action for the specific performance of a contract, and in
Pennsylvania, the Law Courts administer equitable principles. It
is a maxim of equity and adopted in the State of Pennsylvania,
"that he who comes into equity must come in with clean hands."
Whipple conveyed the premises to the defendant in order to prevent his (Whipple's) creditors from taking them. This consti-
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tuted fraud as to the creditors. The fact that Canfield was
aware of the purpose of the transaction and the further fact that
he agreed to reconvey does not help Whipple's case.
In Whitten vs. Freeman-102 Pa. 366, the Court said, "It is
well settled by numerous avthorities that there is no more binding consideration known to the law than the mutual fraud of the
parties. The books are full of cases where a party to fraud has
sought relief in the Courts from the consequences of his unlawful act, but the decisions have been uniformly adverse to such
applications. It is not the province of the law to help a rogue out
of his toils."
Horbaugh vs. Batners--148 Pa. 273. Jones vs. Shaw-8
Sup. 407, hold similarly. In Herobey vs. Wheting-50 Pa. 240,
it was held that he, "who does inequity shall not have equity. The
Court has no relief for a party who in the practice of- one fraud
has become the victim of another."
Whipple has practiced fraud on his creditors and in the practice of fraud, he himself, has been taken by a flank attack, and in
the face of the decisions of our Pennsylvania Courts, as well as
the Courts of other States, he has no grounds for complaint. The
following Pennsylvania cases are in accordance with those already cited. Orne vs. Sittany Coal Co.-114 Pa. 172. Reynolds
vs. Boland-202 Pa. 642. Brown vs. Pateairn-148 Pa. 387.
Brinkley vs. Nole-46 Sup. 531. Blystone vs. Blystone-51 Pa.
273.
In the administration of equitable principles in Common
Law Courts the plaintiff has soiled hands.
In view of all the evidence in the foregoing facts, I conclude that judgment should he rendered in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The composite transaction viz; conveyance and contract to
re-convey, was intended to embarrass the creditors of Whipple.
Canfield knew of his intention, and assisted him in the accomplishment of it. It is difficult, therefore to assert that there was
any less turpitude in Canfield than in Whipple.
A refusal to assist Whipple, is an assistance of Canfield. Why
should the "law" prefer one rascal to another?
Canfield is guilty of a double turpitude. He has defrauded
the creditors of Whipple, and he is now defrauding Whipple. Is
he to be assisted in this twofold villainy?
If Whipple recovers the land, he exposes it to seizure by his
creditors, and thus abolishes the embarrassment to them, which
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his conveyance to Canfield occasioned. One might well think it
would not be below the dignity of the law to assist him in an act
of repentance which would abrogate the wrong of which his first
act was the cause.
That debtors should be deterred from cheating creditors, by
making their fraudulent conveyances irrepealable, may be a good
thing. But it would likewise be a good thing to deter those to
whom they make these conveyances, from accepting them, and
enjoying rewards for their fradulence.
However, some judicial Solon, laid down the principle that a
conveyance fraudulently made should be indefeasible, and his
successors, without overmuch independence or originality have
continued to imitate him.
So, we must come to the decision to which the learned court
below has come, and hold that the plaintiff cannot recover. The
opinion of the court well states the principles which are assumed
to subserve the purposes of honor and honesty.
Jailsson vs. Thomson - 222 Pa. 232. Paul vs. Paul - 266
Pa. 241.
AFFIRMED.
STRAWBRIDGE vs. JOHN JACOBS AND WIFE
Husband and Wife-Liability for Necessaries
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sarah Jacobs, wife of John, purchased kitchen utensils of the
value of $55 from Strawbridge who charged them to her. Not
being paid, he sues in assunpsit both husband and wife, and obtains a judgment against both. Both appeal. The utensils were
necessaries.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FRIEDMAN, J.-This is an appeal by husband and wife from
a judgment against both, in an action of assumpsit for necessaries
purchased by the wife. The case is peculiar inasmuch as no reasons whatever are given for taking the appeal. We shall therefore peruse the acts of Legislature bearing upon the liability of
husband and wife for necessaries, and as this suit does or does not
comply therewith, will allow or deny this appeal.
Three statutes require our attention, the Acts of April 11,
1848, P. L. 536; June 3, 1887, P. L. 332, and June 8, 1893, P. L.
344.
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Under the Act of 1848, the husband was primarily liable for
necessaries, and the wife secondarily. The two later acts changed the previous act in no respect except to increase the liability of
a married woman for necessaries from a secondary liability to a
primary one, and permitting her to be sued alone therefor. Neither of these three statutes has any effect whatever upon the presumption that a wife in purchasing necessaries acts as the agent of
the husband. That presumption must still be overcome by affirmative proof of her undertaking to pay for then-165 Pa. 294.
The very important question now presents itself, "Has Mrs. Jacobs
undetaken to pay for the kitchen utensils?"
What evidence is there of Mrs. Jacobs undertaking to pay for
the goods? She has purchased the utensils and they have been
charged to her, and that seems all. The undertaking to pay is
never presumed but must be shown affirmatively. The act of delivery of the goods to the wife or even the fact that the creditor
has chosen to charge them to her is not enough to render her primarily liable-67 Sup 524. To shift this responsibility to the
wife and to make her estate liable for necessaries, the burden is
on the creditor to show that she assumed by an express agreement the responsibility which the law cast on her husband. From
the evidence before us we are unable to discover an agreement
upon the part of the wife to pay, nor are we willing to presume
such an agreement from the mere charging of the bill to her.
We are further strengthened in our contention by the fact that
the creditor has sued both husband and wife. Had he wished to
charge the wife primarily, he would have sued her alone.
Then how does this action appear in the light of the Act of
11 April, 1848? This act permits suits against husband and wife
and the recovery of judgment against both. The law carefully
guards the separate estate of the wife, and after judgment obtained in a joint action, requires that execution shall first issue
against the husband alone, and if the writ be returned nulla bona,
then an alias execution may be issued which may be levied upon
and satisfied out of the separate property of the wife; and judgment shall not be rendered against the wife in such joint action,
unless it shall have been proved that the debt sued for in such
action was contracted by the wife, i. e., that the sale was made
upon her credit alone or that she promised to pay for them (this
court being of the opinion that this requirement has not been complied with), or, which in 35 Pa. 384 has been interpreted to mean
"and," "incurred for articles necessary for the support of the
family of the said husband and wife," a fact which the parties admit. We clearly see that the provision of the act to the granting
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of a judgment against the wife alone in a joint action, has no application to our case.
But the creditor has sued both husband and wife. In 59 Sup.
485, it is said that the requirement of the statute as to the jointure of husband and wife has application only in cases where the
creditor wishes to hold the wife. But if he wishes to sue the husband alone, he need not join the wife. Here he has sued both husband and wife and since there are no facts to the contrary, the
presumption must remain that he wishes to hold the wife, i. e., to
make her secondarily liable.
The suit and judgment against husband and wife, in strict
compliance with the requirements of the act of 1848, are prima
lacie correct, and since the appellants have given no legal grounds
for their appeal, the judgment against both must remain.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The sale was of necessaries. The husband is liable for the
price of necessaries. That his wife orders them, is to be construed
as the act of an agent. She can procure necessaries, at his expense, even if he forbids her to do so.
The wife, however, may assume a liability, in making a purchase, if she will. That she orders the goods, that they are charged to her on the dealer's books, that they are delivered to her, is
not sufficient evidence of the assumption of this liability. In this
case, there is no other evidence of it. It follows then, that there
was error in giving judgment against the wife.
The husband makes no defence, and judgment against him
was proper.
The reasoning of the learned court below conducted to a different result from that announced, which was a surprise.
Clothier vs. Wolff 66 Superior 328. Moore vs. Copley
-165 Pa. 294.
The judgment against the wife is reversed; that against the
husband is affirmed.
X COMPANY vs. HAGGARD
Sales-

Purchaser for Value-Fraud

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff sold to M. some timber, induced thereto by M's
representations of solvency and abundant property. As soon as
the property was delivered, M. Sold it in payment of a debt due
to Haggard, of $1,000. The Plaintiff shortly afterward learned
of the falsity of M's representation, and, wishing to rescind the
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sale, brings this action of replevin for the timber.
Young for the Plaintiff.
Taggart for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WHITLINGER, J. A sale procured by fraudulent representation of the vendee is not void ab initio, but is voidable at the
option of the vendor and until he elects to rescind the title is in
the vendee. 18 Pepper and Lewis 32, 170; 143 Pa. 605. M therefore took a voidable title from the Plaintiff.
It is provided by the Sales Act of 1915 (P. L. 551) that
"where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title
has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires
good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for
value, and without notice of the seller's defect of title."
The question then is, whether the defendant, Haggard, was
a purchaser for value, or, in other words, whether an antecedent
debt constitutes value when the goods are taken in satisfaction
of such debt. This question is very cleary settled by the further
provision of the above act (P. L. 565) which says that " an antecedent or preexisting claim, whether for money of not, constitutes
value where goods or documents of title are taken either in satisfaction thereof or as security therefor."
The defendant, therefore, was a purchaser for value and acquired good title to the timber in question. Judgment therefore
must be entered for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The facts of this case would have required, before the passage
of the Sales Act, the same decision that that act compels.
The vendee practiced a fraud on the vendor. This entitled
the latter to rescind the contract. But the vendee has transferred
the article to Haggard for $1,000, an existing debt. Haggard thus
is a purchaser for value of the article. Though the vendor could
as against the vendee, have annulled the sale, he could not do so,
as against a bona fide purchaser for value from the vendee.
Lumber Co. vs. Manufacturing Co., 247 Pa. 267. The Sales Act
requires the decision that the learned court below has made.
AFFIRMED.
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BARNES vs. PICKETT
Contract to Buy Stock-Misrepresentation-Failure of
Consideration-Negotiable Instruments Act
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X, undertaking with Pickett by buy for him certain shares of
stock, Pickett gave him a note for Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) payable to X's order. X grossly misrepresented the value
of the stock, and though he obtained it did not transfer it to
Pickett. This note was renewed three times, X still being the
holder of it.
X transferred, by indorsement, the last note to
Barnes, who knew of Pickett's dissatisfaction with X's conduct,
but also knew that he had renewed the note several times. The
defense is: (a) Fraud, (b) Failure of consideration.
Yost for the Plaintiff.
Thompson for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KENNEDY, J.-In
the Negotiable Instrument Act of 1901,
we find codified and coherently arranged the rules deciding the
questions raised in this case. In rendering our decision it will be
but necessary to state relevant extracts from this statute and supplement them with a few court decisions.
Section 28 states "Absence or failure of consideration is a
matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due
course."
Section 51 defines a holder in due course as a holder who
has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
(1)
That is is complete and regular on its face;
(2)
That he became the holder of it before it was overdue
and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such
was the fact;
(3)
That he took it in good faith and for value;
(4)
That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title
of the person negotiating it.
Section 58 provides "In the hands of any holder other than a
holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the
same defences as if it were non-negotiable.
The facts as presented clearly convince us that Barnes was
not a holder in due course within the meaning of the statute.
Since he was aware when he took the note of the conditions under which Pickett had given it we must hold that all defenses
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available against the original payee are also available against
him.
Even under the earlier statutes there was no doubt as to the
uncertain ground on which a purchaser not in due course stood.
Anderson vs. Evans, 4 Phila. 298, holds "One who takes a note
before maturity, but with notice of defences, was not a bona fide
holder and held subject to defences between the original parties.
In Holme vs. Karspar, 5 Binney 469, the court ruled that where
the defendant proved that the note was put in circulation fraudulently, the holder was required to show the consideration he paid
for it and how it came into his hands.
This rule has ever since been recognized and rigorously adhered to. 74 Superior 48 says "If a deceit was practiced by
means of which the notes were obtained or if the consideration
failed and the plaintiff had knowledge of the fact before the
notes were transferred, a defence may be made in the action notwithstanding the plaintiff is the endorsee of the note."
Adams vs. Ashman, 203 Pa. 536, is a case almost on point.
Here it was held "The relation of the plaintiff to the paper was
fixed by the knowledge which it had of the condition under which
the first or original note of the series was issued. If there was
fraudulent misrepresentation which induced its issue, or if there
was failure in the consideration for it, all the subsequent renewals were open to the same defense.
Of the numerous cases cited by counsel for plaintiff we find
one which appears to conflict with the general trend of the decisions. Drum vs. Columbia National Bank, 204 Pa. 53, holds
"The endorser of a promissory note is bound, as soon as he disIn the case at
covers the fraud to assist his rights promptly."
bar, however, Pickett gave the note as the initial movement in the
bargain and he apparently expected X to transfer the stock at
any time. His frequent renewals may be attributed to his faith
Whatever Pickett's motive, we
in X's ultimate performance.
cannot hold that his repeated renewals were authentic evidence
of his intention to hold himself liable, should X fail to perform
his part of the contract.
Judgment for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
There has been a total failure of the consideration for the
Pickett note. It was made in compensation for shares of stock,
which X, the payee, was to procure for Pickett, and which he has
not procured.
There was also gross misrepresentation of the nature of the
shares of stock which he promised to procure.
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The effect of such failure of consideration, and such fraudulent representation was to cast on the endorsee of the note, if he
became so before maturity, the burden of showing that he was
a purchaser for value and without knowledge of Pickett's
defense.
The proof is that Barnes knew of Pickett's dissatisfaction,
and, we may infer, the cause of it. He does not seem to have
proved, as he should have, that he was a purchaser for value. The
learned court below has properly held that he could not recover.
That Pickett renewed the note several times might have led
Barnes to believe, had he known this, that Pickett had no defense.
But, on the other hand, the evidence is that he knew of Pickett's
dissatisfaction. Pickett could not be accused then, of misleading
Barnes into purchasing the note. Barnes had no right, with this
knowledge, to purchase the note with the intention to embarrass
the defense, which, as against X, Pickett had the right to make.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.

HARRISON'S WILL
Wills-Evidence
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Issue to determine whether Harrison had made a will; what
its contents were, and whether he had destroyed it. It could
not be found after his death. Two witnesses testified that they
had seen a will on a certain date, signed by Harrison and disposing of his estate in a certain way. X, a witness, testified
that he had said that he had made such a disposition of his property. A few days before his death he referred to his will and its
contents in such a way as indicated his belief that it was in
existence.
OPINION OF THE COURT
THOMPSON, J.-In the case at hand there are three questions to be decided: First, Did Harrison make a will? second,
What were its contents if a will was made? and third, Did he destroy it?
The first question is answered by the second section of the
act of June 7, 1917. (P. L. 403) known as the Wills Act, provides that in all cases a will "shall be proved by -the oaths and
affirmations of two or more competent witnesses, otherwise the
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will shall be of no effect. And the contents of a lost will or a
will which has been destroyed without the testator's consent cannot be shown until its execution has been proven by the testimony
of two or more competent witnesses. McKenna vs. Murhead, 189
Pa. 440. According to the foregoing citations it was competent
to admit evidence to prove this point.
The second question which the learned counsel for the defendant raises, is a question for the jury, to be decided by them
according to the evidence given. The facts as they appear before
this court say that he disposed of his property by this will in a
CERTAIN WAY which seem to leave no room for doubt as to the
way the property was to be distributed.
The third question, Did Harrison destroy the will? It is
true that "When a will is last seen in the testator's possession, the
presumption is he destroyed it with intent to revoke." Fallon's
Estate, 214 Pa. 584.
However, the presumption is a rebuttable presumption as is
found in Glockner vs. Glockner, 263 Pa. 393, and is a question
for the jury in each particular case. The jury having found that
the testator made the will, the contents of it having been proven
and also the fact that the testator did not revoke the will, the
verdict must be in accord with the facts as found.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
That a will had been made, which cannot be produced after
the death of -the maker of it, may be sufficiently proved.
But that it was executed as the law requires it to be, needs
to be proved as well as its making. Two witnesses would have to
establish the signature of the testator. Two witnesses have testified to the execution of Harrison's will.
The contents of the will would need to be proved. It would
be unreasonable to insist that those who knew him should give
the language of the no longer existent will. To undertake to do
so would expose the witness to doubt of -histruthfulness, which is
exhibited in Mitchell vs. Low, 213 Pa. 526. If the will is a comparatively simple one, an intelligent person, familiar with the
testator's property, and the probable beneficiaries, might easily
recollect the disposition of the property made by it. Two witnesses
who saw the will state -how it disposed of the property. Their
testimony is corroborated by a witness saying that the testator
had related that his will made this disposition. This is sufficient
to prove what the will said and did.
The next question is, was it destroyed animo revocandi by
the testator? It is presumed that it was, since it cannot be found
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that it was thus destroyed. Glockner vs. Glockner, 263 Pa. 393,
Fallon's Estate, 214 Pa. 584, Mitchell vs. Low, 213 Pa. 526, 534.
"A few days before his
What -overcomes this presumption?
death, he referred to his will and to its contents in such a way
that indicated his belief that it was in existence." This was evidence that, at that time, he had not destroyed the will. Sagdeu
vs. St. Leonards, Wigmore's Cases, p. 683. But that time was
"a few days before his death." Unfortunately, we see no reason
for thinking that in these few days he did not form the purpose,
and execute it, to destroy the will. Was he too sick to do it?
Was he unable to reach the will, or to burn, or otherwise cancel
it? Was he too sick to think about it, and to form a plan to destroy it? He may have been, but he may not have been. We do
not think that the evidence is sufficient to repel the inference
from the non-appearance and non-discovery of the will that it
had been put out of existence by the testator. As was suggested
in Mitchell vs. Low, supra., there are two presumptions to be overcome by the evidence. (a) That the testator revoked the will;
(b) That others than himself did not incur the guilt of destroying
the will without his direction and consent.
We are obliged then, to set aside the verdict of the jury as
not sustained by the evidence, and to reverse the judgment of the
Common Pleas.
REVERSED.

ROSE vs. F. AND M. BANK
Failure to Pay Check-Damages

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rose drew a check on the defendant Bank for $75. The
Bank refused to pay. Action for damages. The Bank's account
showed a check for $100 which it had paid. Rose denied the
giving of this check. Without insisting on a decision of the genuineness of this check, Rose drew the check in suit, payable to a
third person knowing that if the $100 had been properly paid his
deposit would not be sufficient to pay the $75 check. The court
told the jury there could be no recovery for damages to reputation
if Rose's check had been drawn with knowledge that the bank
was asserting the payment of the $100 check and its genuineness.
All he could recover would be the amount of the deposit that actually existed.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
KREPS, J.-The plaintiff in this case is seeking to recover
damages for injury to his reputation and business credit, caused
by the failure of the bank to pay his check. There is something more than a breach of contract in such cases; there is a
question of public policy involved, and a breach of implied contract between the bank and its depositor entitles the latter to recover substantial damages, Patterson vs. Marine N. Bank, 130
Pa. 419.
But, the very nature of the injury for which compensation
is sought and principles upon which a recovery is permitted, without proof of actual damage, render it proper to admit evidence
as to the manner in which the plaintiff -has taken precautions to
guard his own reputation in his course of dealing with the defendant and all the circumstances in which the plaintiff gave the
check, payment of which was refused by the bank. 68 Pa. Super.
447.
We think that if the plaintiff, after knowing there was some
discrepancy as to the balance credited to his account, drew the
check without first investigating the matter, he has made his
own voluntary act the cause of the injury to his reputation. The
courts of this state have held in Schultz vs. Wall, 134 Pa. 262,
Weiner vs. North Penn Bank, 65 Pa. Super. 290, that a plaintiff
cannot make his own voluntary act the ground for recovery in
damages.
Further, we consider that the case of Lazar vs. State Bank
of Philadelphia, 74 Super. 1, has settled the law in this state.
That case was an action by a depositor to recover damages from
a bank for dishonoring a check of $45. Evidence was produced
to show that the plaintiff on the day of the dishonoring of the
check for which the suit was brought, presented, in person, a
check for $199 which was refused payment by the cashier of the
bank, who told the plantiff that the balance in his favor was only
$50. The plaintiff then destroyed the check for $100, on which
he was refused payment. Subsequently he drew the check for
$45 upon which payment was refufsed. The court held that under such circumstances it was reversible error to refuse to allow the defendant to ask the plaintiff on cross-examination,
whether knowing these facts as to the discrepancy in his account,
as calculated by himself and computed by the bank, he gave the
dishonored check without making any investigation as to the
character of the discrepancy.
Therefore, we must hold that the plaintiff in this case brought
the damages to his reputation upon himself, by his own voluntary
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act, in drawing the second check with the knowledge of the discrepancy in his account.
Finding no error in the holding of the court below, the decision of that court must be
AFFIRMED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The bank's undertaking, generally, is to pay back the customer's deposit, either in whole, or in parcels, payment of which
he directs by means of check.
But a depositor has no right to compel a bank to pay a check
which it thinks itself not obligated to pay, by subjecting it to exemplary damages. He should sue the bank at once for the deposit, and not by directing the bank by check to do what he has
reason to know it will not do, contrive to punish it for not paying by introducing another person into the relation. If Rose
knew that the bank would probably not honor a check payable to
another, he should not have injured his reputation by incurring the
refusal of the bank to pay such a check. He thus invited the
bank's refusal to pay the check, and published to the payee the
fact that whether he had a right to draw it was in dispute between him and the bank. It is needless to add anything to the
discussion of the learned court below, whose judgment is
AFFIRMED.

WALN vs. McCALL
Evidence-Coincidence

of Witnesses-Function of Court-

Weight of Evidence
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Trespass for personal injuries from a collision of McCall's
automobile with Waln's bicycle. Six witnesses testified. A and
B were the most explicit, and apparently trustworthy, and their
description of the occurance exonerated McCall. The court, reviewing the testimony, stated to the jury that they must find the
facts from a consideration of all the evidence, but that if they
believed A and B, whose testimony coincided, that they would
have to find for McCall. They did so find. Motion for a new
trial.
Goeltz for the Plaintiff.
Hand for the Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
HEEFNER, J.-The answer to the plaintiff's motion for a
new trial depends on whether or not the charge of the court unjustly prejudiced the minds of the jury against the unsuccessful
party, the plaintiff.
It is peculiarly within the province of the court to direct the
jury on questions of law and to leave all questions of fact to the
jury. In general, however, expressions of opinion by the trial
judge as to the facts of the case, or comments upon the weight
of evidence, or the relative credibility of the witnesses, constitute no ground for interfering with the verdict if determination
of the facts is left to the jury.
The general proposition that the jury are to find the facts
is thus given a possible qualification by reason of the importance
which the usual jury will credit to the opinion of the judge. And
this is justly so. It is lamentable that the sound and experienced
wisdom of the trial judge is not to a greater extent permitted to
aid the jury in dispelling and allowing for the smokescreens of
critical and caustic cross-examination and sentiment appealing
addresses of possibly long experienced counsel. The trial judge
is thus particularly fitted to observe an unfair though plausible
presentation of a claim which a peculiar state of facts has rendered expedient to one of the parties. In Goldthorp's Estate,
115 Ia. 430 (88 N. W. 944) it was held that the court did not err
when after directing the jury to consider all the evidence in
the case, it singled out certain matters and said that these in themselves would not be sufficient to establish either claim made by the
contestant.
The peculiarities of some cases call forth certain instructions
from the court which by themselves and under one interpretation
would be prejudicial and which are so singled out by the losing
party, but when they are considered in regard to other instructions relative thereto, may be entirely harmless. It must therefor
appear that there has been an abuse of the court's authority and
reasonably appear that a fair trial was not given. It is within
the sound legal discretion of the court.
No attempt has here been made to classify the witnesses.
The fact that two are stated to have testified to facts which if believed, exonerate the defendant does not work a classification
within the legal sense of the term.
The instruction to find the facts from a consideration of all
the evidence is equivalent to saying that they are to be found
from a preponderance of the evidence and is therefor free from
error. Ill. Cent. R. R. vs. Warriner, 132 Ill. App. 301.
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Neither may the instruction of the court be objected to on
the ground that it is an assumption of fact. In Fitzgerald vs.
Clark, a Mont. case, 30 L. R. A. 803, it was held not to be an assumption of fact to direct what verdict to return in case a certain.
state of facts existed; and to same effect is Hall vs. Posey, 79
Ala. 84, in which the court directed that if they (the jury)
should find certain recited evidence they should find for the
plaintiff.
In addition to the instruction that if the jury believed the
facts as testified to by two of the witnesses the court here had
also admonished the jury that they must find the facts from a
consideration of all the evidence.
It might with equal facility be argued that the jury may have
inferred from the instruction here given that all the facts testified to by A and B were necessary to be found to exonerate McCall that no part of the testimony of A and B could be doubted
if defendant was to receive the verdict. Thus the jury may have
been hindered in their search for the truth which might be found
from the testimony of A and B although some minor parts of it
were in conflict and unsatisfactory.
We are therefor convinced that the instruction of the trial
judge was free from error and that the plaintiff has had his
cause impartially tried.
Motion for new trial denied.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The evidence of the various witnesses is not before us. We
cannot say, then, that A and B did not coincide in their testimany, nor that it did not, if believed, exonerate the defendant
from all fault. There could then be no error in what was said
about the import of their testimony.
Was too great an accent put on their testimony? It wag said
that, if true, the defendant was not liable. But a jury with intelligence enough to be a jury must have undetstood from the
instructions of the court that if the other four witnesses were
believed, the defendant was guilty of negligence. Did the fact
that they were not named belittle their testimony? Did it signify
that the court had contempt or other depreciatory feeling for
them? We cannot say so. Having indicated the discrepancy of
two sets of witnesses by naming those favorable to the defendant,
why is it necessary to name the others?
If the testimonies of the two sets of witnesses were in fact
irreconcilable, the perception of that fact by the court cannot be
thought to be an error. It is idle to say that the jury mu~t rec-
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oncile all the evidence if such reconciliation is impossible, and to
say that the court cannot detect such impossibility, and when it
exists, assume it in its instructions to the jury.
It is fantastic to object that by naming A and B without
disrespect, the court made it hard for the jury to find a verdict
inconsistent with their testimony. We need not assume that the
jury would be more willing to ignore the four witnesses than the
two.
We know that Clapp vs. Vellner, 266 Pa. 332 might with
some plausibility, be urged to be inconsistent with some of the
views here expressed. Narrowly examined, it is not. We must
not magnify the incapacity of the ordinary jurors to discharge
their duties by insinuating that they can be confused, overawed,
obfuscated by every unguarded remark of a judge.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

